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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE
A LECTURE GIVEN AT THE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF THE HAGUE ON AUGUST 1, 1923
By
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SUMMARY

Historical and Scientific Antecedents.-The Peace Conferences
of The Hague.-The Court of justice of Central America.-Official labors upon the occasion of the Peace of 1919.-The Conference of Paris and the Treaty of Versailles.-The Advisory Committee of jurists of The Hague and the decisions of the Council
and Assembly of the League of Nations.-Organization of the
Court.-Election of judges; possible reforms.-The economic life
of the Court and its consolidation.-Its competence; individuals;
penal jurisdiction; international Unions and Bureaus; international
juridical persons who are not States; States.-The Court and the
recognition of States and Governments.-Nature of the disputes
which may be submitted to the Court; resolution of the Institute
of International Law.-Compulsory urisdiction; provisions of the
statute and other Treaties.-Optional jurisdiction.-Advisory
opinions.-Procedure in contested matters; before the Court and
before special bodies; summary procedure.-Rules of Law which
the Court must apply.-Revision.-Sanction and execution of
judgments.-Labors of the Court to date.--New ideas in America.-The present and the future.

I

is a dream become a reality. Greece had a glimpse of it and
indeed almost applied it to her religious problems and certain
political differences; Rome tried it as an instrument of power, at
the beginning of her dominating expansion; the Christian religion
made use of it in the Middle Ages, a sign and a consequence of its
indisputable sovereignty; it is found again at the beginning of the
modern age and after it had appeared in the conceptions of theologians, in the memoirs or books of jurisconsults, diplomats and
T
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philosophers: at the end of the seventeenth century it takes a definite form at the hands of William Penn; it arises from the half
illusory, half practical phantasies of the Abbe de Saint Pierre and,
in the closing years of the eighteenth century, the pen of Jeremy
Bentham conferred upon it the double prestige of his coherent system in the order of scientific research and of his solid and useful
work in the domain of the possible and of the positive.
It was by these stages, amusements of wise men full of illusions, or clever dreams of politicians, that the idea of international
justice travelled across the world until the advent of the great nineteenth century, to which science owes so many successes and life so
many victories, which, from a pure concept made of it a force and
placing at its service the action of humanity made its triumph
possible.
The economists, the authors of public law, and those who cultivate international law, Stuart Mill, Seely, Bluntschli, Hornsby,
Sprague, Kamarowski and so many others that their names are
legion; international or local associations from the Institute to the
Bar Association of New York; institutions for pacifist propaganda
which exist in almost every country and which are always surrounded by numerous and fervent disciples; the periodical press
from the review to the political daily lending itself to the propaganda and diffusion of the ideals which it pursues by all means,
sometimes praising and sometimes combatting, sometimes defending and sometimes attaking or indeed jeering; the national parliaments where the play of politics does not always permit one to
measure the weight and the results of the debates and votes; all in
short have given either to arbitration, obligatory or voluntarily consented to, or to occasional or permanent justice and to the tribunal
which administers it, such a push of opinion and such a force as of
a necessary thing that they have tended to transform into a law of
the universe that well known line of the immortal author of the
Divine Comedy: "Wherever a dispute is born there ought to be a
judgment rendered."
This aspiration, the great international conferences have inscribed on their order of the day. And when at the initiative of the
Emperor of Russia the Hague Conference came together in 1899,
three projects served as the basis of the deliberations, one emanating from the nation which had issued the invitations, and the others
from England and North America. But the participation of a
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large number of nations-especially of those of the New Worldwas missing, and the assembled governments did not as yet have the
national preparation necessary for the solution of the problem.
There are things which are feared more than is reasonable: international justice was one of these.
At the time of the second Peace Conference in 1907, thought
appeared more disposed and public opinion more determined to
take this step in advance. Diplomacy however hesitated before the
new international institution and desired to bring this new institution under its domination as well as to make it subject to its own
exigencies. When the first commission voted obligatory arbitration, to be applied to eight different cases-and it is at this moment
that justice, as a permanent recognized institution, appeared for the
first time in international relations-the majority of the European
World was, to tell the truth, unfavorable to it: because there were,
out of twenty-one votes, eight against it and three not cast. On the
contrary the whole of America-it is fitting to proclaim this to its
honor-resolutely accepted the idea of obligatory arbitration; and
it recalled that it had without doubt practiced arbitration more than
any other part of the world during -the course of the Nineteenth
Century; it remembered also the affair of the Alabama, one of
the most successful of arbitrations and which is so justly commemorated by a plaque of marble in the Municipal Palace at
Geneva.
However the second Peace Conference was not able to arrive
at an agreement with reference to the very grave problem of the
organization of a permanent tribunal, in the absence of which international justice is indeed difficult. The great Powers sought to
monopolize the tribunal, by the number of their judges and by giving to those whom they named a permanent position; it was against
this pretension to an unjust justice that the illustrious Brazilian,
recently deceased, pronounced these irrefutable words:
"This principle [apparently the principle of the equality at law
of all states] is not observed by allowing each state to name a
member of the Court, if he is to sit only for a certain period which
is fixed differently as between the various states according to the
degree of their importance, something which has nothing to do with
this matter, and which, obviously partial to certain European countries, does not correspond to the evident reality of the facts.
"A right which is equal among those possessing it, is not suffered to be exercised on an equal footing when for some, it is restricted to more or less limited periods, while the privilege of exercising it continuously is reserved to others.
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"The states which had been excluded from the First Peace Conference, were not invited to the Second Peace Conference for the
purpose of having them solemnly sign an act diminishing their
sovereignty by reducing them to a scale of classification, which the
more powerful nations would well like to recognize.
"The interests of Peace are not promoted by the creation between states, by means of a contractual stipulatiei, of categories
of sovereignty which humiliate some to the advantage of others,
undermining the basis of the existence of all, and proclaiming, by a
strange paradox, the predominance in law of might over right."
The power of truth is such that in the end it is almost always
victorious. The members ended their deliberations without having
been able to approach a discussion of the project of the tribunal in
the form of a definitive proposition; the final Act merely contained
the following voeu:
"The Conference recommends to the signatory Powers the
adoption of the project annexed hereto of a Convention for the
establishment of a Court of Arbitral Justice, and that it be put into
operation when an agreement shall have been reached regarding the
choice of judges and the constitution of the Court."
It should be observed how, always in the direction of progress
and improvement, the international opinion of the world was evolving. From particular arbitrations in very limited cases, but nevertheless more and more frequent, one passed to the idea of general and
obligatory arbitration; from a tribunal constituted in each kind of
case, either freely, or by the use of lists prepared in advance, one arrives at the scheme of permanent arbitrators always ready to hear
the parties and settle their disputes. If this last system did not go beyond the state of a plan-for it was not possible to find an ingenious
and equitable means to effectuate nominations which would satisfy
all aspirations without meanwhile injuring national independencethe second Peace Conference nevertheless formulated and proposed
uo.r4vi!qx Xiop,!iqo .oi s;lni lu.p-d put Injasn 'os!i umi4j
which today-as we shall see presently-serve as rules for the new
permanent Court.
The final act of the Conference, which we have just mentioned,
was signed on October 18th, 1907, and although for the greater
part of the contracting parties, this act was only a kind of ingenious solution, of which, the object having been attained, there
was no more time to think, on the contrary five American republics,
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Salvador inspired by the same idea and for the purpose of facing certain necessities which were their own, concluded on December 20th of the
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same year, at Washington, an international convention establishing
among themselves a Court of Justice of Central America. Transforming their plan into reality without delay, these republics, a few
months later, on the 25th of May, 1908, installed that tribunal at
Carthage. Thus it is that the first permanent Court of International Justice was a Latin-American institution.
This Court was composed of five judges and two substitutes for
each judge, chosen by each one of the five contracting countries,
from among those persons possessing the requisite qualifications
for the exercise in their own respective countries of the highest
judicial functions and enjoying the highest consideration by reason of their moral authority and their professional abilities.
The jurisdiction of this Court was, in the first place, obligatory
for all disputes or all questions-whatever their origin and nature
might be-arising between the states which founded the Court in
case the chancelleries were unable to arrive at an accord; and in
the second place,--and there it differs from what an institution of
this sort should have been-for all claims brought against one of
the contracting governments by a national of one of the other states
of Central America, having for its origin the violation of a treaty
or convention, or any other case of an international character, after
the means provided by the legislation of the respective countries
had been exhausted or when it was possible to allege a denial of
justice; and this, whether the government of which the plaintiff was
a national supported the claim or not.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of this Court was optional or discretionary over certain matters submitted to it by common agreement by the contracting governments, and which might have arisen
between several of them or between them and private individuals,
and also for the international questions which might have been
submitted to it by virtue of a special accord between one of the
states of Central America and another state.
Article 21 of the treaty stipulated that the Court should adjudicate contested points of fact, according to its own free judgment,
and points of law in conformity to the principles of international
law; article 22 gave it the capacity to determine its own competence.
The interested parties declared themselves ready to submit to
the judgments of the Court and all the contracting states bound
themselves to give it the moral support necessary for their execution and thus according to the text itself, there was a real and positive guarantee of respect for the convention and for the tribunal.
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The capital error of this treaty, memorable for so many reasons, was that its duration was limited to ten years, without automatic extension; at the end of this too short period, and in view of
the judgments rendered, victor and vanquished, the satisfied and
the dissatisfied, the one and the other were not of the same sentiments as regards its re-enactment or the introduction of modification. Furthermore, the war of 1914 supervened, European at the
outset, but soon world wide, and this, in 1917, did not surround
the different states of the world with an atmosphere favorable to
propositions relative to justice and to institutions of law. Add to
that, certain local difficulties from which Central America was not
able to extricate itself, and you will not be astonished that the Court
disappeared with the binding force of the treaty which created it, in
spite of the efforts made by intelligent and foresighted people
to defend it, and of which one may cite as an important example,
the resolution passed by the American Institute of International
Law at its meeting which took place at Havana. ,
But when the World War approached its end and the future
victors came to examine its results and to prepare for its immediate consequences, public opinion realized that the victory could
not be simply a work of force, as brilliant as it would be sterile. In
this twentieth century, humanity could not confine itself to the
writing of a new chapter of history over the battle fields; on the
contrary it was necessary to utilize the enthusiasm provoked by
victory for the establishment of new bases of. life, which would
permit, as far as possible, the avoidance of such disasters. Almost
simultaneously without previous agreement between them, but all
responding to an irrepressible impulsion, official proposals were
made for the organization and functioning of International Justice.
On June 8, 1918, the French Ministerial Commission for the
League of Nations, in a project which was printed in the annex to
the proces-verbal of the first meeting of the commission named for
the same purpose by the Peace Conference, adopted, among others,
the two following articles which bear the number 4 and 5:
Article 4. The League of Nations shall be represented by an
international body which shall be composed of the responsible head
of the Governments or of their delegate. This international body
shall have the following powers: 1, it shall organize an international Court, .

.

. 3, in cases where a peaceful settlement 'is found

impossible, the question shall be submitted to the international
Court if it is susceptible of a judicial settlement. 4, it shall enforce
the execution of its decisions and of those of the international
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Court. At its demand, each nation shall be obliged, in agreement
with the other nations, to use its economic, naval and military
power against any recalcitrant States.
Article 5. The international Court shall decide all the questions which shall be submitted to it either by the international body,
or by any State having a dispute with another State. It shall decide and solve the questions of law which arise between the States,
basing its decisions on custom or on international conventions as
well as on doctrine and jurisprudence. In case of violation of law,
it shall prescribe reparations and the necessary sanctions.
Shortly afterward on the Fourth of July of the same year 1918,
President Wilson delivered his famous speech at Mt. Vernon where
he declared that the fourth of the points indispensable for peace
was the establishment of an organization which should guarantee
that the combined power of free nations would oppose all attacks
upon law, and which would assure peace and justice by virtue of
the constitution of a tribunal of opinion to which all must submit,
and entrusted with the settlement of any international question
upon which the states directly interested have not been able to agree
in a friendly manner.
Twelve days later Col. House submitted to President Wilson a
draft of a constitution for a League of Nations. This draft contained an Article X by virtue of which an international tribunal of
not to exceed fifteen members was to be constituted, with jurisdiction to pass upon all differences between nations relating to the
existence, interpretation or execution of a treaty, which had proved
to be incapable of settlement by diplomacy, arbitration or other
means, or which was submitted to it by mutual consent, or finally,
which dealt with commercial questions, including in this last class
the validity or the effect in international law of a law or a custom.
Article XIV of this draft is worthy of special mention, when
we remember that there is quite a problem to be solved with regard
to sanctions, because it was expressly stipulated therein that any
state which the delegates should decide had not submitted to the
International Court, a dispute over which that Court had jurisdiction, or had not executed the sentence of the Court, lost ipso facto
the right to carry on commerce or entertain relations with the contracting parties.
On the 29th of November of the same year, 1918, immediately
after the Armistice, the Ambassador of France, M. Jusserand,
transmitted to Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State of the United
States, a draft of a plan for the Peace Conference which included
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as part of the organization of the League of Nations the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the Hague. And on the other band,
while the propositions of General Smuts, which appeared in the
famous draft of December 16, 1918, treated-with a certain juridical impropriety-more of arbitration than of justice properly
speaking, the plan of the Covenant of the League of Nations approved in general terms by the English Cabinet and transmitted to
President Wilson by a confidential letter of Lord Robert Cecil
dated January 20, 1919, envisaged the creation of a permanent
court of international justice and stipulated that the states should
not resort to war without having solicited and obtained the sentence
of the Court.
With all these preliminary projects, President Wilson elaborated his three plans for the Covenant of the League, without
mentioning therein in any express and definite way a permanent
tribunal; however, attention should be called to a phrase which was
found in the first plan-a plan which was never given out to the
Commission and which was superseded by the printed proposition
dated January 10, 1919. This phrase, contained in Article IX and
which pre-supposes the existence of a Court, is thus worded:
"In the event of a dispute arising between one of the contracting parties and another Power, the interested contracting parties
bind themselves to obtain the submission of this dispute to a
judicial of arbitral decision."
The Commission of the Conference, more for gaining time than
for any other reason, took as the basis of its deliberations not the
plan of President Wilson, but the English project of February 3,
1919, entitled after the name of its authors, the "Hurst-Miller
Project." This plan, in which the judicial power and the arbitral
function were once more confused, set forth its doctrine in the
following rules:
"Article X. The contracting parties undertake, in cases where
there shall arise between them any question which cannot be settled by the ordinary means of diplomacy, not to resort to arms in
any case without having previously submitted this question and the
problems which it involves, either to arbitration or to the examination of the Executive Council and then not until after a delay of
three months after the sentence of the arbitrators or the recommendation of the Council; they undertake not to resort to arms in any
case against a Member of the League which shall carry out the sentence or recommendation."
"Article XI. The high contracting parties agree, if there shall
arise between them a conflict or a difficulty which they think can
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be submitted to arbitration and cannot be settled in satisfactory
fashion by diplomatic means, to submit the entire matter to arbitration and to carry out with entire good faith the sentence or the
decision given, whatever it may be."
"Article XII. The Executive Council will prepare a plan for
the creation of a Permanent Court of International Justice and this
tribunal will be competent to take cognizance of and to settle all
affairs that the parties recognize as susceptible to be submitted to
arbitration conformably to the preceding Article."
Therefore, when the deliberations of the Commission of the
Peace Conference entrusted with the preparation of the Covenant
of the League of Nations, commenced, the question presented itself
as follows: voluntary arbitration and an optional court constituted
in advance. It is not yet possible, without rivalling the famous
indiscretions of history, to refer to the debates of this commission,
but there is nothing improper in summing up here the results as
they publicly appeared in the plenary sessions of the Conference.
On February 14, 1919, Article XII of the Project which had
become Article XIV was presented in the following form which
had been provisionally adopted:
"Article XIV. The Executive Council will decide upon the
plan creating a permanent court of international jurisdiction to
entertain and render judgments upon all questions which the
parties agree to consider as susceptible to be arbitrated by it according to the terms of the preceding Article."
Fortunately this improper word, arbitration, disappeared in the
final draft which figures in the final text and which constitutes
Article 14 of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919; and at the
same time--and this time less happily-the functions of the Court
were enlarged. Here are the terms of Article XIV:
"The Council is charged with the preparation of a project of a
Permanent Court of International justice and with its submission
to the members of the League. This Court will take cognizance of
all disputes of an international character which the parties shall
submit to it. It will also give advisory opinions on all disputes or
any questions which the Council or the Assembly shall submit
to it."
A tentative proposal was made to give it another duty which
would have bound it in a direct and immediate fashion to the
League of Nations, the special duty of interpreting the Covenant
of the League, but an amendment presented by M. Larnaude in the
name of the French Government was defeated, Lord Robert Cecil
and M. Orlando having made the observation that it would be pre-
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ferable to leave to the Council which was to enforce the Covenant,
the mission of settling the difficulties raised by its interpretation.
It therefore devolved upon the Council to create for the world
a Permanent Court of International Justice entrusted with a double
mission, a judicial mission, consisting of the settlement of differences between States and an advisory mission, consisting of instructing the Council and the Assembly upon all questions or points
which these organizations should submit to it.
On the 10th of January, 1920, the ratifications of fourteen
States which had signed the Treaty of Versailles were officially deposited at Paris-among them, those of six American Republicsand the Council of the League commenced immediately its task with
an activity worthy of the highest praise. At London a month later
on the third of February, it decided to name a committee of jurists
whose duty should be the preparation of a draft of the Statute for
the Permanent Court of International Justice.
On this committee the five Powers called the "Great Powers"
and which had retained this character in international relations
since the end of the war and five other Powers which did not have
such pretensions were represented. The latter were Belgium,
Brazil, Spain, Norway and the Netherlands. The committee met
as soon as possible at the Hague and in little more than a month
between the 16th of June and the 24th of July of the same year,
1920, it prepared a plan which is practically the Statute in its actual
form.
It is not possible to speak of this committee without offering the
tribute of our admiration. Very well documented on almost all of
the previous projects and basing itself particularly upon the work
of the second Hague Conference, it studied thoroughly and settled
successfully the greater part of the problems which presented themselves and had the courage to decide in favor of compulsory jurisdiction for the Court, which, in this manner it immediately and
clearly made the judicial power of the world.
The Council of the League of Nations which studied this plan
during its session of September 16 at Paris, and which approved
it definitively at Brussels at the end of October with the reservation of certain slight modifications of minor importance, refuted to
accept as an absolute rule the compulsory jurisdiction of the court;
in the following December the Assembly at Geneva seeking a compromise satisfactory to the opposing opinions and interests, left the
exercise of the compulsory judicial functions to an additional
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protocol which was purely optional and which might be accepted
permanently or temporarily and with or without reciprocity.
When the Assembly met again the following year, more than
half of the signatory Powers had ratified the Statute and it was
possible to proceed on the 14th and 15th of September, 1921, to the
election of judges. From that time the Court was constituted and
it met in the Peace Palace at the Hague, on January 30, 1922.
Some days later on the 15th of February the official inauguration
was solemnly held. For the first time the world possessed a permanent and definitive institution administering justice between the
nations. The attention of all was directed to it, full of faith and
hopeLet us now examine the rules applicable to the constitution of
this new and extraordinary body with which humanity honors itself, the election of its members, its economic life, its jurisdiction,
its procedure and finally the execution of its decisions.
The Court sits in a permanent manner at the Hague; it is
always ready to exercise its functions. It meets every year on the
fifteenth of June and continues its sessions until all pending matters are settled. The rest of the time it may be convoked by the
president in extraordinary session; it was in fact thus convoked
during the first year of its existence for the purpose of giving an
advisory opinion to the Council of the League of Nations, a matter which at first blush does not seem to be of transcendant importance. During each annual session the Court names a chamber
of three members plus two alternate members, to hear summary
proceedings with reference to all questions which may be submitted to it for that purpose.
The presiding judge as well as the registrar must have his
permanent residence at the Hague so that he may be able to
promulgate before the oral proceedings commence, the procedural
papers as well as the complaints presented, to the end that the
Court may be ready to hold public audiences and render. its decisions after the fifteenth of June.
The Court is composed of fifteen members, of whom eleven
are titular judges and four are alternate judges. Eleven members
may sit at a time and but nine members constitute a quorum. The
Assembly acting upon the proposal of the Council of the League
of Nations may increase the number of judges to twenty-one so
that the titular judges may number fifteen and the alternate judges
six. Up to the present time, the quantity of litigation has neither
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required nor justified this increase which would necessitate a division of the Court into chambers. A Court ought not to have so
many members that it looks like an assembly and that the discussions blunt and delay its opinions. Even now, the actual number
of judges would be somewhat too large if it were not necessary
to face the following consideration. The principal juridical systems of the world as well as the greatest possible number of national systems of legislation must be represented on the Court.
The Statute has prescribed--probably in response to one of
these considerations-that, for matters concerning labor, as well
as for those which concern transportation and communications,
which are, respectively, the subject of Parts XIII and XII of the
Treaty of Versailles, special chambers of five judges and two substitutes are constituted. These Chambers may sit elsewhere than
at the Hague and may take cognizance of matters at the request
of the parties.
What are the conditions of eligibility and the qualities of a
personal nature which the judges should possess? Article 2 of
the Statute says expressly that the Court is a body of independent
magistrates, elected without regard to iheir nationality from among
those persons enjoying the highest moral consideration and who
combine the qualities requisite for the exercise, in their respective
countries, of the highest judicial functions, or who are jurists
possessing a recognized competence in matters of international
law. This is all that is required by the Statute, which has not
indicated minimum or maximum limits of age; however, one may
deduce, from the fact that the official languages of the Court are
fixed by the Statute, that the judges are required to have knowledge, sufficient for the purpose of understanding and writing
French or English. When one recalls on the one hand that the
Court may at the request of the parties authorize the use of other
languages and on the other hand that of the forty-six nation.
which have signed the protocol of the Statute at Geneva, elevet.
speak Spanish, it seems that in the long run, knowledge of this
language may become equally indispensable for the members of
the Court.
The Statute stipulates for the use of the electors certain guiding principles which one should take into account in order to understand the organization of the Court. The electors must bear
in mind that the persons elected should insure in the aggregate
the representation of the great forms of civilization and the prin-
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cipal juridical systems of the world. Furthermore it is expressly
provided that they must elect not more than one candidate from
any one nation. If more than one candidate from any given country is elected on any ballot the senior in point of years will be
considered as elected. It is not without value to indicate in passing
the result of the application of the first of these principles at the
only election which has taken place up to the present time. Out
of eleven titular judges six are Europeans, one is from North
America, two from Latin America and one from Asia. Of the
substitutes three are Europeans, the fourth is Asiatic and there is
none from America. Thus, given the very special political conditions which prevail in Europe the principal juridical systems of
the World and the great forms of civilization are almost completely represented.
The judges are named for nine years but they continue to
exercise their functions until their successors replace them and
they are eligible for re-election. The Statute foresaw for them
certain incompatibilities of function. They may not exercisethe substitutes excepted-any political or administrative functions.
They cannot be agents, counsel or advocates in any international
proceeding. Before taking their seats they pronounce in a public
hearing the solemn engagement to exercise the powers appertaining
to their offices with complete impartiality and according to the
dictates of conscience. It is to be regretted that one does not
find the prohibition of the acceptance by the judges, while they
form part of the Court, of official honors or decorations.
What is the procedure of election? This was very difficult to
establish because it was important not to infringe upon the equality, the sovereignty or the susceptibilities of the various nations.
All the earlier official attempts and all the scientific systems had
failed. It was the delegation from the United States of North
America composed of two eminent men, the great statesman Mr.
Root and the celebrated international jurist, Mr. James Brown
Scott, who found the happy formula.
The electoral procedure consists of two parts: the presentation of candidates and the election itself, each one of these parts
being given respectively to that which one may call the social factor
and the governmental factor. For the first part, the presentation of
candidates, each state leaves the initiative to the four members
which it has named, conformably to the Hague Covention of 1907,
to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. They have been desig-
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nated in advance and there was nothing to make them believe that
they might one day have this duty. In order to enable them to
obtain in a large measure, indications of candidates worthy of the
position it is recommended that they consult in their respective
countries the highest court of justice and the schools of law, the
national juridical academies and the national sections of the international academies devoted to the study of law. It is after this
preliminary sounding out of the official and private organizations,
whose competence in such a matter is recognized, that each national
group is to propose at the maximum four members of whom two
at the outside-note well the importance of this detail--can be of
its own nationality. In this manner the candidates proposed by
each state reflect not only the reputation of each one in his own
country, but also the international reputation of the foreign candidates proposed. Since there are some states which are not represented in the Permanent Court of Arbitration or who may not be
represented in the future, it is stipulated that the government ot
each one of these states will constitute a national group of persons
combining the conditions set forth in Article 44 of the 1907 Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes.
Upon submission of these proposals, the secretary general of
the League of Nations compiles the general list of candidates. It
is from this list, save in an exceptional case to which we will advert later, that those elected are chosen. Then two bodies of the
League of Nations, the Council and Assembly, whose composition
it is important to indicate here briefly, enter upon their functions
as an electoral college. In the first body there figured, at the time
of the election of the judges, the representatives of the four Powers
which with the United States bear, since the Treaty of Versailles,
the title of Great Powers, and which by virtue of this same treaty
are there represented in a permanent manner, as well as the representatives of four other nations designated for this purpose since
the treaty: Belgium, Brazil, China and Spain. Today the Powers
which constitute this second category and which are periodically
designated by the Assembly are six in number instead of four:
Greece and Uruguay have been added to those we have just mentioned. In the Assembly on the other hand, all the Members of
the League are represented with one vote for each.
These two bodies proceed independently of each other, using
the list of candidates as a basis, to the election, first, of the titular
judges and thereafter, of the substitute judges. If one first bal-
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lot does not give an absolute majority to all the necessary candidates, two ballots are taken and those are proclaimed elected who
have received an absolute majority in the double vote of the Assembly and Council. If after a third ballot there still remain certain seats to fill, a mixed commission of mediation is designated,
composed of three persons for each of the electoral colleges, with
the object of choosing a candidate to present for the separate
adoption of the Council and Assembly; this candidate may be chosen with entire freedom from among all persons satisfying the
requisite conditions whether or not his name appears on the list
of candidates.
If, however, it is impossible to settle the election in this manner, the electoral body is changed: the League of Nations delegates this function to the Permanent Court itself. The Court
exercises it, however, with a curious restriction. Whereas the
Mixed Commission, as we have indicated, may choose its candidates from outside the list of eligibles, the Court must designate
them not even from the full list of candidates, but exclusively
from among those persons who have received votes either in the
Assembly or in the Council.
No provision is made to fill definitive vacancies by means of
the substitute judges. A new election is held, following the
method previously explained, but the newly elected judge merely
completes the term of office of his predecessor.
There is a special case in which the number of judges is augmented otherwise than by election. Conformably to Article 31 of
the Statute, judges of the nationality of the parties have the right
to sit in the matter which is before the Court and if one of the
parties does not have on the bench a judge of its nationality, whereas the other has such a judge, the former may designate to sit on
the bench the substitute judge which is of its nationality, or if such
substitute judge does not exist it may choose a judge. All parties
have this right if there is not a judge of their nationality. This
system invites criticism because it does not square with the idea
of the international independence of the judges and because it
runs counter to the doctrine which the famous publicist, Sir R.
Seely, formulated in these terms on February 28, 1871:
"There ought to be no representation of interest on a judicial
bench; a good court is not one where both parties are represented
on the bench, but where neither is."
This defect is inherited from the arbitrations, which never-
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theless in other cases have done much good both to the international idea and to the possibility of a permanent tribunal.
However that may be, in view of a work realized by unanimous
consent, whereas everyone believed it almost impossible of realization, one is compelled to applaud rather than to censure, and to
give free course to praise rather than to criticism. A method has
been found to which no one has objected for electing an international tribunal; this election has been carried out without protests or difficulties. What more could one desire?
It is easy, however, to note certain anomalies for which time
will bring forth a remedy. For example not all the nations which
form the League have accepted and ratified the Statute; but yet
all through the Council and the Assembly elect the judges, a faculty which is expressly conferred on them by this same statute.
And on the other hand the Court does not exist only for the
Members of the League of Nations. By virtue of the Treaty of
Versailles which has given it life, by virtue of conventions the
number of which increases continuously, by virtue of the Statute
itself, by virtue of the resolutions of the Council of December 13,
1920, and May 17, 1922, the Court is open to the States mentioned
in the Annex to the Covenant of the League and to all the other
States who desire to utilize it, either in a compulsory or optional
manner. And the states of this last group who submit to the
jurisdiction of the Court and who eventually contribute to its expenses do not take part in the election of the judges because they
are not represented in the Council and in the Assembly. In this
way, there is with respect to such states a slight inequality, which
to a certain degree binds the Court to the League, but which will
tend to disappear if the vigorous efforts of President Harding are
successful in the United States.
The solution is very simple. It would be sufficient to modify
the Statute, in such a manner that the states who are Members of
the League of Nations, and who have not ratified the Statute, shall
not form part of the Assembly and Council when they meet as
electoral colleges for the nomination of judges; in exchange, at
the meeting of the Assembly, and perhaps for certain Powers,
at the meeting of the Council, the representation of all the states
which have accepted in a satisfactory and legal manner the jurisdiction of the Court would be provided for. There would be only
one other difficulty to resolve, and this we shall examine later
when we consider anew the resolution of the Council dated May
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17, 1922, cited above, and the provision of the Statute by virtue
of which it was passed.
The procedure which I have indicated and according to which
the Court henceforth will complete itself when vacancies occur
does not appear acceptable at first sight. As a matter of fact and
in spite of the maintenance of the ingenious and very useful system of the list of candidates this procedure will have a result contrary to those democratic principles which are bound to obtain between states as between individuals. A power will in this case,
perpetuate itself by the sole fact of its own will, substituted for
that of the world. And furthermore some people fear that, thus,
the Court will be transformed into super-state more dangerous
according to them than the League. Others fear lest it weaken
itself lacking the warmth and vital force which will give it the
support of the world. And finally it is of the utmost importance
not to forget that the Court must represent the great forms of
civilization and the principal juridical systems of the world.
When the chancelleries, although not yet accustomed to the
court's existence and although not yet convinced by experience of
its advantages, begin sending cases to it, and the number of these
cases shall necessitate an important increase in the number of
judges constituting the Court, to allow them to carry out successfully the duty imposed upon them, it will probably happen that a
judge will be designated for each State, and chambers composed
of a limited number of judges will be formed. These chambers
would take up in turn the cases on the calendar, thus justice would
remain international and a more complete equality between the
nations would preside over its administration and its rendition.
But before we arrive at that moment, let us see what is the
actual reality and let us remember that the 9th year after their
election, the judges normally cease to exercise their functions.
This system has the following disadvantages,: certain eminent
men who must in order to live depend upon their personal labor
will not be without hesitation at the thought of being obliged to
give up their habitual labors and to risk the possibility of not finding them again upon their return, for a function certainly of the
highest dignity in the world but yet temporary in its nature.
It is certain that nominations for life would to some extent
eliminate the possibility that states other than those represented on
the court may have in their turn a judge, but on the other hand
the system of rotation offers another danger. It tends to diminish
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the probability of the reelection of a good judge, forcing him
thus to recommence a struggle for life after having consecrated
nine years to international justice. But this problem has more
than one solution and certainly a satisfactory one will presently
be found.
However that may be, let us examine the economic aspect
of the existence of the Court. Today, like the majority of international bodies, the Tribunal is supported by annual contributions
written into the budgets of the various states and constituting
part of the sums paid to the League of Nations. This method is
the habitual and recognized method; its adoption has not presented
any difficulties but it binds together the economic lot of the two
institutions, of which one is more frequently attacked than the other, and causes justice to run the grave risk that either a war between two or more great Powers or a lack of equilibrium in the
national budgets of certain states may put its existence or its
functioning in the greatest danger.
It would be very easy to give it a moral personality and to
establish a patrimony for it. One might attempt to give it a
beginning of the realization of economic stability by augmenting
the annual contributions by a relatively unimportant percentage
destined to be capitalized. That sum which is left over out of
its ordinary budget, that which is produced by its printed publications and that which perhaps the philanthropists of the world,
who are more and more inclined toward such indubitable benefits for humanity, may give, all these things will, little by little,
augment its wealth and go to diminish the contribution of the
League of Nations to the point where the latter will be completely
done away with. Consider the weight in each national Parliament
which the voice of the representative who, when in the domestic
affairs of a state the public services do not have sufficient money,
computes the sum appropriated for paying a tribunal which has
not been employed a single time during these years by the people
who are supporting it in part, would have; imagine what may
be the resistance to the acceptance of the statute in states whose
budgetary strength is not great and who do not envisage in the
immediate future any international complications. The success.
the stability, the -force of this new institution would have grown
in an extraordinary fashion if for its financial life, it did not depend upon others than itself, and if it disposed of resources of
its own to sustain itself and to grow steadily with the natural
needs of international justice.
(To be continued)

